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 Defective Arguments Denying an Inconvenient Truth 
Jim Edward Gough 
1. I CANNOT ACCEPT AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH 
The public discussion about global warming—its science, its effects, the human-based causes 
and the predicted consequences—suffers from a failure to employ the process of reasoning to 
change one’s mind and subsequent determined behaviour, a process known as argumentation. 
We make good decisions based on a process that involves unbiased rational deliberation of the 
situation as it is and as it could predictably become. Instead, there is often a different approach. 
This involves an allegiance relationship to ideology, which does not address the challenge of 
argument. It is ineffective at bringing about reason-based change to beliefs, attitudes, and 
subsequent behaviour about the environment and serves only to entrench existing conflicting 
views. The issue of global warming has serious consequences for humankind and the natural 
world. This world is the basis of our life. Perhaps people are rendered inactive by the sheer 
speed and magnitude of the changes to the earth or rendered inactive by paralyzing inertia 
brought about by believing that “it just cannot be true” or “it cannot be accepted,” making it 
unbelievable in all of its ramifications for current and future generations.  
Al Gore claims this inaction is due to our pathological fear of the destructive consequences of 
global warming producing a “profound sense of powerlessness” (Gore 2006, 224) and fuelling a 
“collision and addictive unhealthy relationship to the earth” (Gore 2006, 223). But such 
addictive behaviours turn people who could solve problems into passive spectators and 
sometimes blind enablers. This is both unhelpful for discussions designed to bring about 
changes to our understanding and appreciation of the need to rationally change our beliefs and 
attitudes about the environment in order to determine a better approach and behaviour 
towards dealing with the global warming problems. There are few long-term solutions to 
problems when the motivation is fear, which holds temporary sway over our behaviour at best.  
Environmentalists are often worried about the negative effects of sounding the alarm, which 
may turn out to be counter-productive for any possible solution. Instead of producing reaction 
it creates inaction. This inaction, however, is further exacerbated by the reactions to global 
warming arguments by non-argumentative global warming deniers. These deniers provide a 
seeming rationalization (not reason) for why the psychological inertia may be acceptable or 
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reasonable. Excuses are not arguments but rather ways of avoiding argumentation and the 
rational collection and relevant use of evidence and reasons to persuade.  
Global warming deniers are diverse people whose similar reasoning strategy rests in the 
preservation of ideology. This classification is made without prejudice, not intended to poison 
the well by assuming an ad-hominem or guilt-by-association connotation but rather to stipulate 
a collection of strategies that seem to have an affinity with each other for one end—the denial 
of an ideologically inconvenient truth. The “global denier” classification is made simply for 
heuristic reasons of convenience: grouping some argument strategies together helps to identify 
similar features in argumentation. 1 These deniers display a set of similar, questionable, 
rhetorical, and ideological strategies in their attempt to persuade the public without even 
attempting to meet the challenge of argumentation to provide acceptable, sufficient and 
relevant evidence, facts or reasons (Shermer 1997, 46-55).2 These ideological inclinations make 
argumentation about something as important as global warming, not merely very difficult but 
potentially impossible. The ideological approach of global warming deniers may even have 
inspired serious political oppression of opposing views, like the first voicing of the view that the 
environment is heating up because of a human-caused increase in the amount of carbon in the 
atmosphere (Bowen 2008, 23).3  
If deliberate social action is to be connected to reasoning, then actions occur because of a prior 
rational commitment. A substantive commitment is defined as having three central features: (1) 
stability over time and a capacity to be revised, (2) action-guiding force, and (3) a rational 
relation to self-understanding and identity that is self-reflective. Argumentation can provide the 
means to achieve (1)(3). The commitment is open to reasonable challenge by counter 
evidence or counter considerations at both (1) and (3) so as to revise (2) in light of new or open 
possibilities. On the other hand, any unreflective commitment made on the basis of ideology 
can only provide the basis, perhaps of (2) with no necessary connection to (1) since it contains 
no capacity to be revised and it could provide a connection to (3) only if the reference to “self-
                                                     
1 This is a legal term intended to allow someone the ability to make a claim bracketing off any negative 
connotations to the claim that may be a part of some negative interpretations of it. 
2 There is also a tendency among the deniers to embrace technology over nature in what Jacques Ellul (1980, 118) 
called the “technological imperative” such that they share the false claim that technology is neutral and like 
globalization is immune to blame for any evils to the natural world. 
3 One of the first people to identify the problem of global warming, and one of the world’s acknowledged 
authorities on global warming, Dr. James Hansen, director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, faced 
political threats and intimidation (Bowen 2008). Hansen’s initial claim in 1981 that global warming was due to 
anthropogenic causes was finally vindicated in the 2007 Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate.  Hansen 
suffered the effects of “institutionalized bullying” with threats to his livelihood, research projects, research 
position, and so on.  
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reflection” is removed (Lieberman 1998, 5). 4  Substantive commitment may require a 
background of argumentation to support this loyalty so that it is not blind action (Toulmin 1969, 
3). 
On the other hand, ideology situates loyalty differently so that it is the central feature of an 
unreflective commitment overriding considerations (1)(3). As Johnson and Blair (1977) point 
out the fallacy of blind loyalty “prevents you from even considering the evidence produced in 
an attack on something you hold dear…discounting in advance the possibility of evidence… 
refusing to acknowledge documentation that is plainly evident…when deeply-rooted 
identifications are attacked” (132-133). It is my suggestion that this move to blind loyalty 
negates the very possibility of argumentation and is a central focus in an irrational ideological 
commitment.  
There is a simplification in my outline of the connection of action to commitment that cannot 
be allowed to go unnoticed. The connection is generally one to which many people—but not 
all—normatively aspire. Critics are correct to point out that “not even my reasoning combined 
with my deciding or forming the intention to carry it out is enough alone to produce the action” 
since emotions and circumstances can conspire to break any claimed uniformly predictable 
logical or causal connection (Stroud 2000, 27-38). So, the critic can correctly point out that my 
analysis here is a simplification of a process that may require a complex set of conditions in 
order to predict outcomes accurately. True enough. But those wanting more than my sketch of 
the conditions can find more comprehensive considerations elsewhere for comparison 
(Toulmin 1969). 
Inaction is manifest as a rationalized excuse. This excuse provides little to no motivation to put 
to work relevantly available public knowledge about the environment and our relationship with 
it. 
This incorporates changes to our living space within the natural world. When inaction is the 
easiest and most convenient route to take, the motivation is there. We become the tools, 
passive instruments manipulated by defective arguments and the motivational excuses these 
tools provide. It is, therefore, incumbent on those who value the protection of the natural 
environment to speak to this issue of what might be called “no general populus motivation” in 
light of clear knowledge to change our involvement in the life of the natural world. We have an 
ethical duty to prevent harm when we can, to inform and motivate those who need information 
about the natural world (Coeckelbergh 2015). Failure to do so is a failure to act ethically to 
                                                     
4 This is a reference to a slightly modified version of the defining central features of commitment spelled out and 
developed in Lieberman (1998). It also may be a version of the mistake or fallacy in arguing known as wishful 
thinking, the view that what should or ought to (prescriptive claim) be the case, is, in fact, the case (descriptive 
claim), identified by several writers, including Browne and Keeley (2001, 102). 
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bring about what are claimed to be important ethical changes to our engagement with the 
natural world. This Principle of Benevolence is fundamental to human beings surviving in 
organized societies (Denise et al. 1999, 167). 
There are various ways this ideological commitment to action or inaction operates through 
global deniers. First, sometimes the attack is against the messenger as a member of a claimed-
to-be discredited group (guilt by association) rather than the message. An individual who 
identifies himself or herself as an environmentalist takes on a task, and perhaps even a social 
role which is not that of a scientist, as accurately documented, for example by David Suzuki in 
his autobiography (1988, 218-221). The goals of an environmentalist are, for example, not 
necessarily aligned with the promotion of the goals of science since science is not necessarily 
used in the interests of promoting the good of the environment but rather the promotion of 
scientific knowledge. This is not just a diversion off the main topic (issue); it is a diversion away 
from argumentation in alignment with the denier’s preferred ideology. However, rather than 
attack the messenger, it is important to identify some features of the message conveyed, with 
these forming the basis of a challenge rooted in argument. This argumentation view is 
particularly philosophical in the sense that philosophers continue to challenge in a state of a 
“permanent foundation crisis, where (i) there is always a dispute about fundamentals [and] (ii) 
neither method nor any other alternative resource provides a neutral Archimedean fulcrum for 
the weighing of philosophical issues” (Rescher 2001, 42).  
Second, there is unwillingness on the part of deniers to engage in argumentation, to take up 
the challenge to provide substantive evidence or reasons for one’s controversial and 
opinionated claims (Gough 2001). This means they refuse to consider changing their beliefs and 
actions based on good reasoning. Third, there is the implicit belief that subjective, unsupported, 
uninformed opinion should count as much as arguments to convince us of any controversial 
claim, with no recognition that there is any significant difference between the two processes 
(Gough 2005).5 This seems to be based on the mistaken belief that disagreement built on 
contradictory claims suffices as an instance of a counter argument or counter instance, which is 
a straw man misunderstanding of the aim and function of counter considerations in meeting 
the challenge of argumentation. The burden of proof always falls to the individual making the 
controversial claim, the outsiders to the mountain of evidence and experts that support the 
contrary view (Shermer 1997, 50-51). This is not an appeal to simple numbers but to the 
convincing weight of acceptable, relevant and sufficient grounds to change one’s mind and 
actions (Govier 1985). 
                                                     
5 This is a common mistake in my experience often made in classroom discussions of ethical issues and claims.  
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Fourth, there is the fundamental belief that particular ideological interpretations of economic 
considerations absolutely override or trump any other value determinations. One economist 
suggests, “no one is conscious of his ideology, any more than he can smell his own breath.” So, 
for example, if one course of action costs less to perform than any other, it is automatically 
better than any other course of action [which might cost more]. This position has been called 
identity politics with an ideological component such that “taking benign capitalism as one of its 
basic assumptions, this ideology must deny the harsh realities of the global marketplace and 
posit false causes for its many shortcomings (for example, unemployment among the white 
lower class is ‘caused’ by affirmative action and not by the relocation of manufacturing to 
cheaper overseas labour markets)” (Williams 1998, 281). This is, of course, inconsistent with 
most ethical theories or principles, which generally claim that doing the right thing should 
override considerations of minor economic costs. Fifth, the denier believes that no sacrifice of 
self-interest, based on considerations of other non-human values, human values of future 
generations, and human values of current populations that are not directed in his or her line of 
sight, is ever justified. Each of these components of the denier’s position will be examined and 
critically evaluated in what follows.  
2. THE CRITICAL SITUATION OF GLOBAL WARMING DENIERS 
In the introduction to the film An Inconvenient Truth (2006), Al Gore, former Vice President of 
the United States (who has a science degree and has studied the science of global warming for 
more than 20 years) says: “This [global warming] is not a political issue. It is a moral issue.” 
Global warming deniers are generally unwilling to meet either the moral challenge posed by 
Gore and others or the scientific/rational challenge posed by the results of independent, 
scientific, expert, reviewed research by more than 3,000 scientists from across the world. The 
deniers take the route of diverting our attention off topic, a red herring attacking the 
messengers of global warming (like Al Gore and Dr. David Suzuki) and ignoring both the 
scientific evidence and the moral imperative implicated by this evidence. As soon as the 
messenger becomes the enemy, an important issue becomes tainted with irrelevant ideological 
politicizing. In the magazine article “The Trials of Saint Suzuki,” Suzuki’s fall from grace as an 
environmental purist is anticipated on the flimsiest of support and with the frank concession 
that it seems to be the media itself that has set him up for the fall (MacQueen 2007, 66-72). 
While it might appear like he is attempting to become more inclusive in the community by 
engaging businesses like Walmart in the creation of environmental solutions, others seemed 
willing to cry “sell-out” to discredit any change in strategy. The supporters seemed offended by 
any attempt by someone identified so thoroughly as one of their own to negotiate with those 
who pursue mediation with capitalist entrepreneurs. This route takes us nowhere towards 
resolving any controversy over global warming; it’s another red herring diversion away from the 
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issues raised by an environmentalist in favour of an attack on his change, strategies, and the 
possible motives that could have precipitated it, all of which are irrelevant. Oddly enough, 
Suzuki’s negotiations with Walmart establish that he does not consider himself to be a saintly, 
holier than thou, aloof, environmentalist but the kind of pragmatist the denier critics value.  
Also, in the strategy they follow they implicitly deny both Suzuki’s and Gore’s claims, without 
ever challenging them as well as denying that the issue is a moral one and not a political issue. 
Sometimes this diversion is accomplished by setting up a straw saint, then demonstrating how 
the saint fails to lead a holy life consistent with the false character created for him. Once the 
move is made to an ideological political debate then all human behaviour is predicated on the 
motivation of self-interest in an ideally (yet unrealizable) free-market competitive model of 
decision-making (Robinson 1968, 42).   
Rather than basing their rejection of global warming claims on actual science, these deniers are 
desperate for any evidence to support their cynicism. So interested in non-existent support, 
within one hour of it appearing on the web, deniers had posted on various email list servers and 
websites as well as a talk radio program a version of a fake scientific report. These deniers 
“jumped on a fake research article on the internet claiming that deep sea bacteria—not 
humans—are responsible for global warming.” Dr. Mark Cox, the fake name of the author of 
the fake research paper, in a fake journal with a fake editor, said that the hoax was designed 
“to expose the credulity and scientific illiteracy of climate skeptics” (Cressey 2007). Of course, 
this strategy might have positive effects even though the means to awaken climate skeptics 
from their dogmatic slumber seems less than ethically praiseworthy. The so-called Sokal hoax, 
where a physicist wrote an article titled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a 
Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” (Sokal 2006) satirized using ridiculous and 
exaggerated claims to ridicule claims made in political criticisms of science but the effort did 
much to fuel science wars and not to create any mediated negotiation of differences (Dusek 
2006, 21). Productive social change was negated by mutual sublimation and entrenchment 
rather than an opening up—on either side—to new possibilities. Ideological motivations 
overpowered critical argumentation as the basis for good decision-making.  
Web-based critics of global warming are of some importance because of the ease of access to 
their writings. In the case of one web site, the popularity of a science fiction writer, whose 
books and movies have had a wide audience of believers in fictional dramatization as facts, 
especially about recreating dinosaurs in a set of computer-generated technical feasts for the 
eyes and the imagination has inappropriately been the source of claims to authoritative expert 
knowledge. There is a difference between wordsmithing a fascinating movie script and 
supporting a scientifically credible claim.  Michael Crichton (2003; 2005) fashioned what he 
characterized as a sustained attack against the fundamentalist/environmentalist’s politicizing of 
The Trumpeter ISSN 0832-6193 Volume 32, No. 1 (2016) 
 
Jim Edward Gough 
 
61 
global warming. Ironically Crichton’s attack seems better directed to his own non-
argumentation efforts than to those of his foes, but this may be due to some ideological 
blinders he seemed to be wearing.  
3. FROM PERIPHERY TO CORE POPULARITY 
When spokespeople for the environment move from the periphery to the forefront of public 
discussion, then their new found popularity sets them up for a volley of personal attacks: Gore’s 
home is a great consumer of energy; Suzuki seems impatient with those who want to subject 
his views to public debate or his bus is not the best choice for travelling and maintaining 
ecological integrity since biofuels are a costly use of land resources, and so on. All of these 
claims, of course, are irrelevant to the message. The messenger is not the message, nor is he a 
saint or saviour of divine origin, morally superior to the rest of the human race. For a historical 
reference to the same process, one need only read the attempts to discredit the characters of 
Martin Luther King Jr. or Mahatma Gandhi, in order to deny and divert attention away from 
their messages and the moral/rational challenges they presented. The main point of the 
denier’s strategy to attack the messenger is to confuse people so they say “I just do not know 
who to believe” on the false assumption that there is some point to reasonably doubt the 
message based on irrelevant attacks on the messenger. The public’s attention is diverted away 
from the message to the messenger with the attendant effect of a re-focus in the mind of the 
audience of the message around a non-existent controversy between experts in climate 
change. However, of any scientific predication of late, the one about climate change numbers 
its supporters in the thousands across the globe, from diverse situations and engaging in more 
and more scientific studies.  
The denier gives us no reason to doubt the science or the message. Confusion created by 
distraction and diversion cannot distort what is right. Shifting the priority to the messenger 
from the message is not only irrelevant but also unethical as it indicates that considerations of 
the person should take priority over the message and avoids the challenge of argument. There 
are all kinds of humans who give us a good message but are unable to live up to it fully, 
including religious prophets, like Jesus Christ or even Gandhi.6 
4. MEETING THE CHALLENGE IN A PUBLIC DEBATE 
When discussing issues of public concern, the responsibility of the discussant is to make sure 
the debate is conducted on a level in which the maximum amount of relevant information will 
be available so the public can make well-informed decisions. Open, rationally considered 
                                                     
6 Gandhi’s self-reflective approach employing the ideas of sarvodaya, universal justice and concern for all, ahimsa, 
do no harm, satyagraha, truth above all, and trusteeship, employing only what is immediately needed in order to 
hold some in reserve for others, are all factors in favour of an approach to global warming not based on ideology 
but cooperative actions. 
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skeptical challenges are the mainstay of both science and morality because it provides the basis 
for opening our minds to other possible alternatives, alternatives based on competing evidence 
or equally viable interpretations of the same evidence. Science as a profession is, and has been 
for a very long time, openly skeptical of the processes used to collect evidence, formulate 
hypotheses and germinate theories. This approach has generally made scientific discoveries and 
claims very reliable as the source for making good decisions in the public interest. This is the 
mainstay of a well-informed and effective liberal democracy.  
Deniers, however, are generally not open-minded skeptics but rather closed-minded 
uninformed ideologues—by their own admission.  Many of their opinion pieces start with ‘good 
ol’ boy’ arrogant, ignorant, and self-deprecating lines like, “I’m not educated (like those whose 
views I oppose) and I know nothing (other than what I want or prefer to believe that is in my 
personal best interest) but you should pay attention to me because I have an (uninformed) 
opinion that you should both respect and accept.” Anyone who buys this line should be open to 
paying big money for my pet rock! The focus for the denier is on any science that will protect 
the interests of his or her political, self-interested ideology. Implicitly, science that is 
inconsistent with or at odds with the denier’s self-serving ideology is bad science or not science 
at all. The filter for the denier is political ideology, not open-minded skeptical inquiry, which is 
often avowed as the goal of science. 
If supporters of a global warming warning focus the discussion on changes from 
anthropocentric bias to an earth-based view, then there will be sparse references to an earlier 
(unrelated) set of predictions of a global winter created by a nuclear disaster. The initial 
conditions that spawned the predictions of a nuclear winter are significantly different from 
those that form the basis for global warming. So, the only thing both predictions have in 
common is that they were both made by scientists—based on different assumptions and 
evidence! Deniers of the predictive explanatory power of the theory of evolution follow a 
similar non-rational path of diversions off topic, focusing on insignificant gaps and the 
differences in measurement provided by carbon dating as opposed to radiometric dating. 
Significantly once the gaps are explained and the measurements improved, the theory 
essentially remains intact. 7  
5. OPINIONATED LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
Some people, namely some newspaper editors, seem to think that opinionated letters to the 
editor are important because they spur debate and emotionally engage people in public issues. 
                                                     
7 I call such references to relevant but insignificant and insufficient facts a “cherry picking” approach which is not 
systematic and not theoretically significant in causing anyone to have good reasons to overturn the findings of 
science using a controlled systematic approach that is both relevant and sufficient, offering adequate grounds for 
considered judgements.  
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I am not one of these people. Opinions are often best kept to oneself, especially in those cases 
when voicing them creates more unhelpful dissonance and conflict, making sound rational 
decisions impossible. As an example of what seems to be a frustrating waste of time, I’m not 
convinced by a recent letter from a global temperature change denier (Jeffrey 2007) on the 
basis of this letter’s non-evidence to support its disclaiming of science-based global 
temperature changes.  
The letter doesn’t contain an argument so I cannot give you a summary of it. Instead, this 
denier gives ample reasons to believe that (a) his letter is about his own opinionated view of 
self-serving economics—“these sorts of restraints will only make Canada less competitive and 
drive industry and manufacturing away” (based on opinionated speculation, no evidence 
provided)—a claim not widely supported by economists. It is not about what the denier 
inconsistently claims it is about—“there is no way to accurately link major climatic events with 
human activity” (again, his opinion with no evidence provided), and (b) his own letter 
demonstrates the fault he accuses others of committing—“wearing no clothes” or offering no 
evidence. It is an interesting and puzzling phenomenon, especially for teachers, that some 
people commit the very mistake they accuse others of making, suggesting a kind of myopic 
thinking that inhibits open mindedness in results. In place of evidence, he offers introductory 
textbook fallacious mistakes in reasoning like “the green pedants have truly become proficient 
spin doctors at generating science fiction to support their cause” (again, no evidence, no 
argument, no rational response but a personal irrelevant attack against Suzuki and Gore),8 
which of course does not counter the evidence-based claims of thousands of independent 
scientific studies about global temperature change found in authoritative research journals and 
publications as well as on credible web sites attached to major educational institutions across 
North America.9 
6. MISTAKES IN REASONING 
One thing the denier and I agree with is that “Albertans aren’t dumb,” but our basis for saying so is 
different. I rely on reasoning and I won’t be convinced by any opinion based on mistakes in 
reasoning, like the common one that confuses cause and effect.10 These mistakes are often found on 
unreliable and non-credible denier websites.11 I am also not convinced by irrelevant red herring scare 
                                                     
8 This seems to be the presumptive approach of American Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump with 
his championing of catchphrases, like “lying Ted” over rationally considered reflective critical responses to 
opponent’s views.   
9 See Gough (2008) for an initial consideration of the problem of web-based information in research.  
10 This is a mistake rarely, if ever, made by a scientist following rigorous use of the scientific experimental method.  
11 We need to ask ourselves: Who authored the site—someone or some organization with expert-tested scientific 
knowledge or someone or some organization with no scientific expertise and an ideological axe to grind instead of 
reliable evidence-based, ideologically-avoiding, independent authority?  
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tactic diversions like, “Alberta’s natural resources are under the sole jurisdiction of the province of 
Alberta, not the government of Canada.”12 Consider also irrelevant simplistic accounts of how 
“carbon dioxide is basically plant food”13 that can’t meet the challenge posed by empirical evidence 
favouring the global temperature change claim. Albertans who have even a minimal understanding 
of science will not confuse the cause of an increase14 in water vapour15 with the effect16 since no 
actual scientific research can support any kind of reverse/confused causation and remain credible.17 
If the deniers were able to provide more than name calling and unsupported opinionated 
speculation, one might be convinced that “mankind is not causing cataclysmic changes to the 
Earth’s climate” but unfortunately, what the denier gives the reader according to his own 
words, “lacks any real, proven and empirical scientific evidence” (Jeffrey 2007). Due to some 
kind of sympathetic/symbiotic affinitive response, deniers seem to find each other. In the case 
of this letter, for example, it sounds like some of the information (opinionated speculation?) in 
the letter came from a non-scientific, non-credible website authored by someone without any 
identified scientific credentials and the letter is strewn with quotations from other “letters to 
the editor” or vaguely identified “lectures,” instead of reliable scientific studies in peer-
reviewed publications (Archer 2007, 25).18 Letters to the editor, of course, are not subjected to 
review by experts in the field, while books like those of Archer have the authority of a science-
educated expert or reviewing process. Letters to the editor are not primarily meant to inform 
but to interest readers in buying the newspaper, sometimes initially to read and then to get 
upset by the most outrageous claims possible. This sells newspapers. Such incitement of public 
interest can sometimes be considered a good goal but may not elicit an informed, 
knowledgeable response to change anyone’s mind about anything. Sometimes people may 
object that these kinds of letters to the editor are “taken in the wrong way” as an inducement 
to the reader to respond with an argument or as containing an argument, when they may also 
be a parody of an argument—an attempt to ease tension with humour. However likely these 
possible motives, the effect is more often to cause subsequent writers to cite the uninformed 
views of the letter writer as if they constituted an argument or some other piece of authority to 
                                                     
12 What has this got to do with claims to support global warming? The answer would seem to be—nothing, making 
it completely irrelevant to the topic at hand.  
13 We need to ask ourselves the relevant skeptical question: What does this prove? In and of itself, it seems to 
prove nothing relevant to the topic at hand.  
14 Sometimes this is claimed to be 25 percent or greater but without scientific backing the sky is the limit for any 
piece of unfounded speculation.  
15 This is an increase in the amount of gases creating atmospheric temperature increases.  
16 This is an increase in water vapour brought about by a measurable increase in greenhouse gases.  
17 Although not described exactly as I identify the mistake, Cederblom and Paulsen (1986) identify the mistake as 
“the causal mistake might be in the wrong direction” (186) and in general this could fall under the mistake of 
confusing a correlation or association with causation.  
18 Such publications are relatively easy to find and to understand. 
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disclaim the arguments of those “egg-headed thinkers”19 whose goal is to impress and at the 
same time confound the general public.  
7. CONFUSING IDEOLOGICAL POLITICAL CONCERNS WITH ETHICAL INTERESTS 
At first it may seem confusing, but the first thing a denier does is interpret an ethical concern, 
interest or imperative as a political claim meant to restrict his or her natural right to freedom, 
to choose individually for themselves without recourse to any collective or community and its 
interests. So, most deniers make a category mistake by reducing ethical issues to political ones. 
These are not the same nor do they raise the same challenges. You may need to provide me 
with some reasons of expediency or practical immediate self-interest why I should allow for 
some restrictions on my individual freedom of choice, but this is a political consideration and 
not necessarily an ethical concern. The reasons given to support a decision about the 
environmental impact of global warming may be ethical in order to convince me to restrain my 
political interests but these are not political reasons for a political restriction. The denier, 
however, seems to see the world only in political terms. So, while Gore claims he is asserting an 
ethical consideration, the denier interprets this as a political claim made by someone as far left 
as it is possible to go and remain a human being. Since the welfare of others, anyone other than 
oneself, may be an interest of some of those on the left in politics, the political category usurps 
the ethical consideration. I don’t, for example, make a political claim that I know of when I tell 
my daughter that she should show respect for the interests of her sister, and in making this 
claim, I don’t consider myself to be a left-leaning political animal of one sort or another. 
The denier understands the problem of global warming as an ideological and political issue that 
is being manipulated inappropriately or contrived to get an individual’s compliance with what is 
for them an ideologically-imposed response to a problem. The denier falsely claims there is no 
political discussion of the issue, no consensus vote, no political process of deliberation and 
decision. That’s right. This is not a political issue but an ethical issue. There is no plausible 
reason to doubt the science because there is a political conspiracy to thwart “contrary science,” 
but because of something much simpler: there is no contrary science. There are counter-factual 
and contrary claims constituting the basis for a disagreement but not an argument. If you 
disagree with my argument, it is a mistake to think that your disagreement alone constitutes a 
reason to doubt my argument, cause suspicion of my motives, or condemn a unified body of 
support based on the careful gathering of evidence or reasoning to the best overall reasoned 
response . There is a faulty comparison between a knowledge-grounded and developed 
                                                     
19 Academics are often accused to be those who simply confuse very simple issues and responses that people of 
practical abilities can clearly understand. Also, as if to compound the academic malaise, many of them are 
diagnosed as suffering from debilitating “communist” thinking or tendencies, all of which are unsupported and 
probably false. 
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scientific approach based on the findings of many scientists employing tested procedures. 
These procedures are repeated, under controlled conditions, in a variety of circumstances over 
variations in time and place. An opinion is based on what the person who holds the opinion 
would like to be the case. It’s a self-authenticating personal preference.20  
The conversation would take on a to-and-fro movement between those involved, a willingness 
to subject one’s beliefs to the critical scrutiny of others, and a willingness to take serious 
counter considerations into account in the revision or abandonment of one’s position or 
conclusion. Martin Heidegger identifies this as the process of hermeneutics (Inwood 2000). 
Informal logicians advise students who create arguments to employ what they call the rebuttal 
criterion (Damer 1995, 16-17). That is, “when people read or hear an argument they keep a 
running mental record of the participants’ commitments…they maintain mental commitment 
stores or commitment tags,” which “will typically change during the debate, as participants 
accept and reject each other’s assertions” (Rips 2008, 703). But ideological tags or political 
commitments are often not subject to argumentative negotiation (Crusius and Channell 2003). 
Instead, plausibility is defined by the denier antecedently as political or political/economic 
ideology, such that ideological plausibility is the very fabric of the denier’s existing knowledge 
with respect to the way the world “is” and necessarily has to be. Rips calls these deniers those 
who follow “a conservative commitment policy,” which “makes a speaker’s commitment to a 
claim less likely to change on the basis of later conversational moves” so that “speakers would 
tend to retain their initial positions toward a claim through subsequent exchanges” (2008, 706). 
I find the suggestion that a conservative could move his or her position to a moderate or liberal 
stance, on the basis of the moves within a conversational argument (and that such a staging 
could function as common ground in dispute resolution), beyond belief when it comes to 
entrenched ideological commitments. This would seem to, implausibly, require a different logic 
for each different ideological commitment.  
Nicholas Rescher’s (2001) rejection of possible worlds’ machinery to resolve counterfactual 
dispute resolution among arguers is instructive of the problem in this instance. The intent of 
the use of some counterfactuals in arguments, he claims, is to preserve “to the greatest 
reasonable extent the fabric of our existing knowledge with regard to how matters actually 
stand in this world of ours” (222). However, when the arguer combines what he accepts as 
“givens” along with his predominant assumptions, then there is an “inconsistent set of 
propositions” established, which is unacceptable. This necessitates a “consistency-restoring 
alternative,” which involves a priority ranking of alternatives or negotiated or mediating 
                                                     
20 This is different from an opinion voiced by someone in a position to have the authority of expert, tested 
specialized knowledge, such as a physician who offers “informed advice” or the expert opinions presented in a law 
court.  
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alternatives (Rescher 2001, 223). He describes the general situation as follows: Each of our 
beliefs is surrounded by a family of others so that the introduction of a belief-countervailing 
assumption introduces logical inconsistencies, and the resolution of these inconsistencies can 
be accomplished in a variety of different ways, since in such conflicts there are generally 
different ways of making some of the conflict-engendering beliefs give way to others. We 
require a policy of prioritizing, and given such a resource we can then choose effectively among 
the competing possibilities. 
However, Rescher’s account suffers the same problem as Rips’ account. Rescher claims “the 
situation is that of making the optimal—minimally disruptive—readjustment in our accepted 
beliefs compatible with introducing that belief-contravening assumption among them” and “all 
that is ever needed is an acceptability prioritization with respect to the handful of propositions 
that figure immediately in the particular case at hand” (2001, 226; italics in original). However, 
like Rips, it appears we need to negotiate or mediate between arguers, on the basis of an 
acceptable prioritization principle relevant to “the particular case at hand,” which seems in the 
case of ideological motivation akin to moving the earth’s axis and its rotation in a different 
direction—functionally impossible, though theoretically interesting.  
 8. CONFOUNDING LOCAL WEATHER WITH GLOBAL CLIMATE PATTERNED VARIATIONS 
 In the face of overwhelming evidence pointing in one direction, then, the denier’s strategy is to 
move from science to anecdotal narrative. This is a version of the mistake of diversion, a 
mistaken inference from some specific part of the global weather patterned system to a claim 
about the characteristics of the general system itself. So, for example, it is not uncommon to 
hear someone in a colder climate say something like the following: “If we are supposed to be 
experiencing global warming then why are our winters as cold as ever?” However, the issue is 
not whether some part of the global weather system is warmer than usual but rather whether 
the patterns in the overall system are statistically warmer than in the past. This is the mistake 
that Arnaud (1964) called “passing from a qualified truth to an absolute truth” (261) and what 
others have characterized as confusion over findings at the micro level indicating something 
substantive about what is happening at the macro level—an inductive mistake like hasty 
generalization.  
Since weather affects people so personally, it is difficult for them to extrapolate from their own 
situation to that of a system of which their perspective is only a very small part. There is failure 
to be able to stand back and consider, from several sources, predictions about patterned 
variations, not always regular but concomitted alterations that have probability predictors. To 
situate oneself as observer of one’s own situation to that of a system over a protracted period 
of time is to make a reasoning mistake. This may be to represent the accidental as essential, as 
in the fallacy of accident (Aristotle Sophistical Refutations 1401b14), but it may also more likely 
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be an instance of the fallacy of composition (Toulmin et al. 1979, 182-183) by making a claim 
about the whole of the weather system based on particular individual and potentially 
disconnected regional experiences.21  
9. ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT  
Finally, the deniers seem to have the economic trump card, which basically starts with the 
completely unsupported claim that the good life and ecological values are consistent and can 
be reduced to economic calculations, while no economic inefficiencies can be sacrificed for 
either the good life or ecological values. When did we sign our lives over to the economic 
calculators, to those whose calculations and predictions are some of the least reliable of all the 
sciences?  I don’t remember. Maybe I was walking in the woods at the time. The use of 
economic efficiencies to trump action on the environment is a sad case of the ‘tail wagging the 
dog.’ We are supposed to be so well informed or well educated formally or through experience 
that we are able to control the use of economic efficiencies, not allow them to control us. 
When did we surrender our individual freedom to economic efficiencies, predicted by 
economists’ basing their calculations on our assumed self-serving egoistic behaviour? I didn’t 
surrender and I am not sure others did. However, we are being told a story we did. This 
assumes, without argument, a certain relationship between all human beings and the natural 
world when what is needed is an argument.  
As a general rule of thumb, scientists attempt to determine the truth as impartially as possible 
and subject their research to public scrutiny, which is based on evidence-based criticism. By 
contrast, most deniers seem to have an ideologically-based agenda, often involving another 
conspiracy, such that “Among climatologists, this is common knowledge (95 percent of 
greenhouse gas effects caused by water vapour) but among special interests, certain 
government groups, and news reporters this fact is under-emphasized or just ignored 
altogether,” which makes the focus on scientific research and the truth incidental or irrelevant 
(Jeffrey 2007). Or, alternatively, they focus on so-called conspiratorial agendas to get us to do 
something that we really don’t have to do if it weren’t for the perceived threat of a conspiracy. 
This conspiracy is often part of a left-leaning, red threat to our unrestrained self-interested 
pursuit of our own interests exclusively of any and all effects. Michael Crichton’s speeches fall 
into this category of big, left-wing-dominated, government-destroying individual freedoms. A 
good question to ask of the deniers is: Why would anyone want to do this? On this strategy, 
scientific evidence isn’t important if it doesn’t fit the agenda. Any interpretation of scientific 
evidence must fit prior allegiance to the political/ideological story.  
                                                     
21 This is a mistake in reasoning that could be an inductive mistake or a mistaken comparison. A more critical 
comprehensive discussion of the fallacies of composition and division is detailed in Daniel and Gough (2009). 
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It can be reasonably recommended that any reader should not consider accepting the claims in 
this letter to the editor or from any other denier, before subjecting all their claims to credibility, 
reliability or evidence-based authority tests (not opinionated, agenda-driven speculation; 
Gough 2008). If there is open debate, then the condition should be that it is informed and not 
an ignorance-based debate in a free and democratic society. The freedom to shout lies, 
introduce the unfounded threat of invisible conspiracies, unfairly discredit genuine scientists 
who base predictions on knowledge instead of bias, ascribe false motives of political control or 
domination to global warming proponents like Suzuki and Gore, is not ethically acceptable in 
any public argumentation context because of how it impinges on the choices of others to base 
their decisions on the truth. Doing so creates a climate of confusion, not enlightenment. The 
freedom to create false expectations that “we really don’t have to do anything because, 
according to some opinions published in the paper, there is no reason to sacrifice our self-
interest for some dubious theory about global warming” is ethically unacceptable because it 
portrays the situation of the world in a false light, leading to mistaken judgements of value. 
What the denier fails to recognize is that political freedom has ethical constraints, without 
which political freedom would be simply political license. To speak in the public domain about 
issues that can have serious ethical implications is to speak responsibly in a trustworthy fashion, 
which is to assume an ethical position with all of the reasonable expectations that follow from 
such a position.    
Should we pause and reconsider the possible damage caused by global warming and our 
response to it based on the unsupported opinions of deniers or the determinations of 
ideological perspectives over reasoned considerations of evidence? Not for a moment! But, 
someone might respond, “Isn’t it important to subject prevailing views to critical scrutiny?” Of 
course it is, but only if the critic does his or her best to get accurate information, seeks to 
discover the truth rather than avoid it, accepts the challenge of argumentation, and does not 
retreat to opinionating to save ideology. We should pause to ponder why an “inconvenient 
truth” would cause deniers to inform us of their lack of information and why others might even 
consider that these deniers provided any reasonable or credible challenge at all to the truth 
about global warming. Free speech is important, but not when it is simply the voicing of 
unsupported and unsupportable opinions, especially when such opinions do nothing to advance 
our clear understanding of what is happening to the earth and what we may need to do about 
it. Free speech is clearly not an end but rather a means or a way of determining what is true—
what is true based on tested means of providing reasoned support for a claim.  
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